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The Promise and Precondition
of Educational Autonomy
by NEAL KUMAR KATYAL'
Grutter was not a surprise. A close reading of what the Court
had said since 1978 strongly suggested that a majority would permit
affirmative action in the university admissions setting But the
Court's reasoning, particularly its embrace of educational autonomy,
was unexpected. In Grutter, Justice O'Connor's majority opinion said
that the "long recognized" tradition "of educational autonomy,"
"grounded in the First Amendment," allows a university to consider
race and ethnicity during the admissions process because "attaining a
diverse student body is at the heart of the Law School's proper
institutional mission."3 Despite what the critics are saying about it,
this autonomy argument stands on solid footing, anchored by both
caselaw and good common sense.
Part One of this Essay defends the Court's analysis. The thesis
here is a simple one: Universities should have a zone of freedom in
which to conduct their academic affairs because they are better at
making choices about educational matters than are generalist courts.
This is the position I took, both in the Sixth Circuit and in the
Supreme Court, as the chief counsel to the amicus deans of many of
the nation's leading private law schools in Grutter. Academic freedom
has become something of a pariah concept; indeed, our amicus brief
contained the only substantial discussion, let alone defense, of
1. John Carroll Research Professor, Georgetown University Law Center.
2. Neal Kumar Katyal, Why Affirmative Action in American Colleges and
Universities Should be Constitutional, 39 J. BLACKS IN HIGHER ED. 96 (2003); Akhil Reed
Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke's Fate, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1745, 1753-72 (1996); Neal
Kumar Katyal, Why Affirmative Action in Higher Education is Safe in the Courts, 9 J.
BLACKS IN HIGHER ED. 83 (1995); Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, School
Colors, NEW REPUBLIC, July 17 & 24, 1995, at 24.
3. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003). See also id. at 328 ("The Law
School's educational judgment that [seeking racial and ethnic] diversity is essential to its
educational mission is one to which we defer .... Our holding today is in keeping with our
tradition of giving a degree of deference to a university's academic decisions .... We have
long recognized that, given the important purpose of public education and the expansive
freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university environment, universities
occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition.").
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educational autonomy among the various briefs filed in the case.
Grutter's celebration of such autonomy was by necessity modest, for
what was left unmentioned were the many abuses of power in the
name of academic freedom.
To construct a viable system of deference to university
decisionmaking, one must isolate not only the advantages of
autonomy, but also its dangers. Part Two, to that end, sets forth some
structural preconditions before academic autonomy claims should be
recognized by courts. The Part explains why universities that seek to
use educational autonomy to defend their admissions practices must
release admissions data to a broader set of people than university
administrators. As such, I issue a cautionary note to universities that
are tempted to use their autonomy wantonly to carry out policies that
cross the constitutional line.
This Essay does not respond to the critics of Grutter who think
that diversity-based hiring is a smokescreen for crass racial
preferences. Rather, it centers around the following question: If
universities are to take Grutter and Bakke at face-value (as I believe
they can and should), and implement a policy based on the value of
diversity, how should they go about doing it? My claim is that
educational autonomy, by itself, cannot become a shield to protect
universities from all sorts of questionable practices. Rather,
universities must engage in a greater degree of self-governance
(including faculty decisionmaking over admissions policies and
perhaps even peer review of these policies) before educational
autonomy can insulate their practices from judicial review.
Part One: The Promise of Educational Autonomy
The position of the private law deans whom I represented in
Grutter was that institutions of higher learning should have a zone of
freedom to operate with respect to their admissions decisions.4 This
zone of freedom was not, as our brief explained, an unlimited one. It
would not, for example, excuse decisions made on the basis of
animus.5 But in close cases, the brief argued, the courts should defer
4. The brief at the Supreme Court was on behalf of the Deans of law schools at
Columbia, Cornell, Duke, Georgetown, New York University, Northwestern, University
of Chicago, University of Pennsylvania, Stanford, and Yale. At the Sixth Circuit, the brief
was filed on behalf of the Deans of law schools at Columbia, Cornell, Duke, Georgetown,
Harvard, University of New York University, Pennsylvania, and Yale.
5. Brief of Judith Areen et al., Grutter v. Bollinger, No. 02-241, available at
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/nkk/ptublications.html#Chapters [hereinafter
"Brief of Judith Areen"].
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EDUCATIONAL AUTONOMY
to the considered judgments of the academy as to the best learning
environment for its students. Academic institutions are better
situated than generalist federal courts to evaluate the merits of the
competing arguments in these cases.
"Academic autonomy" was not some catchy phrase we tossed
into the brief because of its alliterative superiority to "academic
freedom." Rather, we used the term because it reflected a difference
in claim.6 Despite a somewhat noble strain of "academic freedom"
that arises when the government persecutes those with unpopular or
unconventional ideas,7 more recently the claim has been associated
with holocaust deniers, racists, sexists, and other miscreants.8 In all of
these disputes, the matter is pitted as the individual faculty member
against the university, and typically arises in the context of discipline,
promotion, or tenure. This face of academic freedom is the
"standard" one - one about individual faculty members and their
rights of research, writing, and teaching. But there is a second face to
academic freedom, one of the university itself, to make educational
judgments for the sake of its students. It is this second, institutional,
face that has gotten obscured with all of the lurid publicity about the
first.
Despite the fact that many institutions of higher learning in
Europe have received academic autonomy for centuries,9 in America
6. See id. at 21 ("Academic autonomy is at the heart of this challenge to the
University of Michigan's admissions process, as Justice Powell's seminal opinion in Bakke
makes clear.").
7. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 112 (1959) (in a case regarding a
conviction of a teacher for failing to answer questions before a hearing of Congress, the
Court announced that "[w]hen academic teaching-freedom and its corollary learning-
freedom, so essential to the well-being of the Nation, are claimed, this Court will always be
on the alert against intrusion ... into this constitutionally protected domain."); Sweezy v.
New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (reversing contempt proceeding against
professor who refused to answer questions by holding that the liberties associated with
academic freedom are clearly "areas in which government should be extremely reticent to
tread").
8. E.g., Hardy v. Jefferson Cmty. Coll., 260 F.3d 671, 672, 682 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding
that a school could not fail to renew the contract of a professor who used the words
'nigger' and 'bitch' because of the professor's "rights to free speech and academic
freedom"); Robert O'Neil, Symposium: Free Speech and Community: Free Speech in the
College Community, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 537 (1997) (discussing academic freedom claims of
holocaust deniers).
9. See Mark G. Yudof, Three Faces of Academic Freedom, 32 LOY. L. REV. 831, 851
(1987) (describing British tradition); Walter P. Metzger, Symposium on Academic
Freedom: Profession and Constitution: Two Definitions of Academic Freedom in America,
66 TEX. L. REV. 1265, 1270 (1988) ("[T]he German concept of academic freedom
contained a tertium quid: the university's right, under the direction of its senior professors
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the concept of "academic freedom" has largely been associated with
the standard view described above. For example, the classic 1915
General Report of the Committee on Academic Freedom and
Academic Tenure, a committee of fifteen eminent professors,
centered their discussions of academic freedom on the rights and
obligations of individual professors."0 When crafting the brief for the
private law school deans, I wanted to use language that captured
something that was not necessarily broader, but that was different,
from this other face of academic freedom. In short, the goal was to
describe a tradition of deference to universities with respect to their
educational decisionmaking.
This second face of academic freedom, as my colleague Peter
Byrne has shown, flows out of two American nineteenth-century legal
phenomena: academic abstention (which "has long specifically
preserved university freedom from state regulation. It describes the
traditional refusal of courts to extend common law rules of liability to
colleges when doing so would interfere with the college
administration's good faith performance of its core functions")" and
state constitutional law (which "endow[] state universities with the
status of being separate branches of government"). 2 The latter was
particularly important as a background fact in Grutter, because it
turns out that Michigan enacted the first constitutional provision for
the separate government of its state university in its 1850
Constitution. 3
Perhaps the earliest explicit recognition of academic autonomy
by members of the Supreme Court can be found in Justice
organized into separate faculties and a common senate, to control its internal affairs.
Academic self-government - the heart of the somewhat cryptic phrase Freiheit der
Wissenschaft - was acclaimed by German theorists not only for its own sake, but also for
the essential protection it accorded to freedom of teaching and research."); ROBERT K.
POCK & JONATHAN D. FIFE, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION:
RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND LIMITATIONS 6-7 (1993) ("It is certain that German
conceptions of academic freedom played a major role in framing modem notions of
academic freedom in the United States.").
10. See General Report of the Committee on Academic Freedom and Academic
Tenure (1915), reprinted in 53 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 393 (1990) [hereinafter "1915
Committee Report"].
11. J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First Amendment,"
99 YALE L.J. 251, 323 (1989).
12. Id. at 327.
13. See MICH. CONST. of 1850, art. XIII, §§ 6-8, amended by MICH. CONST. ART.
VIII, § 5. "The Michigan courts have consistently construed the provision as a prohibition
against all attempts by the legislature to interfere with the academic management of the
university." Byrne, supra note 11, at 327.
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Frankfurter and Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Sweezy v. New
Hampshire." As those Justices put it, "Political power must abstain
from intrusion into this activity of freedom, pursued in the interest of
wise government and the people's well-being, except for reasons that
are exigent and obviously compelling.... This means the exclusion
of governmental intervention in the intellectual life of a university. ' ' 5
In making this claim, Justices Frankfurter and Harlan echoed a theme
of the Sweezy majority:
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American
universities is almost self-evident. No one should under-
estimate the vital role in a democracy that is played by those
who guide and train our youth. To impose any strait jacket
upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities
would imperil the future of our Nation.6
These explicit references to academic autonomy were built on several
legal developments made over the preceding 150 years. As the
historian Walter Metzger has shown:
Institutional autonomy was no Johnny-come-lately to
educational law when it cropped up in the Sweezy case. Long
before it was linked to academic freedom, the idea that
educational institutions should be shielded from the clutch of
government had been embodied in a constitutional decision
prohibiting the revocation of college charters by state
legislatures, and had been turned by educators into a political
shibboleth that for a century had kept the regulatory power of
the central state at bay. Though beset by the manifold
involvements of the federal government in education after
World War II, this ideational descendant of John Marshall and
Thomas Jefferson was too deeply embedded in the American
legal culture to be suddenly discovered or laid aside. 7
It was this second face of academic freedom, as recognized in
Sweezy, that Justice Powell invoked by name in his Bakke
concurrence. In discussing the diversity rationale, Justice Powell built
on Justices Frankfurter and Harlan's invocation in Sweezy of the
14. 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result).
15. Id. at 262.
16. Id. at 250.
17. Walter P. Metzger, Profession and Constitution: Two Definitions of Academic
Freedom in America, 66 TEx. L. REV. 1265, 1315 (1988).
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"'four essential freedoms' that constitute academic freedom," one of
which is to decide "'who may be admitted to study.""... And in the
years between Bakke and Grutter, the Supreme Court unanimously
invoked this very discussion by Justice Powell to explain that
"autonomous decision making by the academy itself" is necessary for
such freedom to thrive.' 9 Indeed, in a previous case involving the
University of Michigan, the Justices analogized academic autonomy
to the way it reviewed personnel decision practices by state and local
governments, concluding that even greater autonomy here was
appropriate due to the comparative expertise of the academy:
Add[ing] to our concern... is a reluctance to trench on the
prerogatives of state and local educational institutions and our
responsibility to safeguard their academic freedom, "a special
concern of the First Amendment." Keyishian v. Board of
Regents. If a "federal court is not the appropriate forum in
which to review the multitude of personnel decisions that are
made daily by public agencies," Bishop v. Wood, far less is it
suited to evaluate the substance of the multitude of academic
decisions that are made daily by faculty members of public
educational institutions - decisions that require "an expert
evaluation of cumulative information and [are] not readily
adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or administrative
decision making.,
20
In addition, although far more circumscribed, the autonomy
universities enjoy shares similarities with the operation of religious
institutions.2' And while this institutional face of academic freedom
18. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (quoting Sweezy,
354 U.S. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result)); see also id. ("The freedom of a
university to make its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its student
body.").
19. Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 n.12 (1985). See also
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276-77 (1981) ("Nor do we question the right of the
University to make academic judgments as to how best to allocate scarce resources or 'to
determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall
be taught, and who may be admitted to study."') (citing Justice Frankfurter's opinion in
Sweezy and Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke).
20. Ewing, 474 U.S. at 226 (citations and footnote omitted). And, in the midst of this
very language, the Court's opinion made clear that "[d]iscretion to determine, on
academic grounds, who may be admitted to study, has been described as one of 'the four
essential freedoms,' of a university." Id. at 226 n.12 (citing Bakke).
21. See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708-09 (1976)
(holding that the court below "impermissibly substitute[d] its own inquiry into church
polity and resolutions based thereon of those disputes," and that "[tlo permit civil courts
to probe deeply enough into the allocation of power within a [hierarchical] church so as to
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can be criticized, like its individual-professor-centered counterpart,
for being potentially unbounded,22 that criticism is true of any
deference-based argument in jurisprudence. Yet federal courts
routinely defer to all sorts of bodies: administrative agencies, prison
officials, expert witnesses, military officials, state administrators, and
the like.23
The discussion of academic freedom in Grutter, in short, was not
some afterthought, shorn of history or precedential support. Rather,
the concept was built on a recognition of the First Amendment
concerns of government intrusion into higher education, coupled with
a healthy skepticism about the ability of generalist federal courts to
make decisions for a university with respect to learning. However, by
using the singular term "academic freedom" to lump together
academic autonomy cases with the standard First Amendment claims
of individual professors, the Court's language since Sweezy has
obscured the vitality of this second face of academic freedom,
institutional autonomy, in the caselaw. In short, Grutter recognized a
limited principle of comparative academic expertise - a principle that
is built on how the Court treats other special institutions in American
society. One can disavow the individualist professor-centered claims
about academic freedom and still support this circumscribed
argument from institutional expertise.
The need for this limited academic autonomy principle becomes
quite clear when one turns to the position of the United States
Government, as amicus, in Grutter. The Government argued that
universities could eschew for all applicants traditional indicia of merit,
such as test scores, as a method to increase the diversity of its entering
class. Its brief harped repeatedly on the benefits of a geographical
solution, like the State of Texas's 10% plan for its undergraduate
body at University of Texas.24 Of course, such solutions do not work
decide.., religious law [governing church polity] ... would violate the First Amendment"
(third & fourth alterations in original) (quotation omitted)).
22. See, e.g., Walter P. Metzger, Professional and Legal Limits to Academic Freedom,
20 J.C. & U.L. 1, 1 (1993) ("Academic defenders of academic freedom... tend to be
disquieted by attempts to define its limits: efforts to pound boundary markers into this
fragile terrain have been known to produce slippery slopes."); Michael A. Olivas,
Reflections on Professorial Academic Freedom: Second Thoughts on the Third 'Essential
Freedom,' 45 STAN. L. REV. 1835, 1835 (1993) (describing academic freedom as "poorly
understood and ill-defined").
23. See, e.g., Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
24. Brief of Amici Curiae United States at 17, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306
(2003) (No. -02-241), available at
http://www.umich.edu/-urel/admissions/legallgru-amicus-ussc/us-gru.pdf (last visited Feb.
Fall 20031 EDUCATIONAL AUTONOMY
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
for graduate schools or law schools with national and international
student bodies. Geographical solutions also happen to be rooted in
the historical contingency of residential segregation that is a
consequence of past racism. But to the extent that such alternatives
ever amount to producing diversity in admissions, they exact a price
upon other values such as candor, transparency, merit, and truth.25
Hypocrisy and subterfuge are inimical to ordinary academic
principles. Schools should be free to consider adopting these plans
despite their obvious flaws; but to use the Equal Protection Clause as
a bludgeon to compel their adoption is a wholesale interference with
university decisionmaking.
At the same time, the fact that there is an upside to academic
autonomy does not mean that there are not downsides. Consider, for
example, how a strong variant of the academic freedom principle
could insulate universities from discrimination claims brought by
minorities. If the university is free to discriminate against whites, the
argument goes, why isn't it free to do the same to African-
Americans?26  But there is quite a difference between these two
positions, most particularly because it is harder to envision
circumstances in which a majority would discriminate against itself
27
out of animus. In circumstances of clear and purposeful
1, 2004).
25. See John Yoo, as quoted in Jeffrey Rosen, Damage Control, NEW YORKER, Feb.
23, 1998, at 64, 68 (stating that under the California plan, "if you still want to get African-
Americans and Hispanics in you have to redefine the central mission of the research
university in a way that lowers standards for everybody .... Once you start telling people
that merit doesn't matter when they're at the formative stages of their careers, I think you
do long and lasting damage to America.").
26. See Curt A. Levey, Symposium on Confronting Realities: The Legal, Moral, and
Constitutional Issues Involving Diversity: Panel III: Affirmative Action: Racial Preferences
in Admissions: Myths, Harms, and Alternatives, 66 ALB. L. REV. 489, 498-99 (2003)
(stating that the academic freedom argument in Bakke is "the least convincing of all
because Justice Powell is not even consistent here... [T]he idea that universities have the
academic freedom to make race-based decisions is a very scary notion. What about a
school's academic freedom to decide that an all-White student body is the best thing?");
see also Alan M. Dershowitz & Laura Hanft, Affirmative Action and the Harvard College -
Discretion Model: Paradigm or Pretext? 1 CARDOZO L. REV. 379, 409 (1979) (stating that
Bakke's emphasis on academic freedom and diversity "could even allow a university to
weigh an applicant's race or religion negatively - as Harvard did under President Lowell -
in order to enhance diversity in the face of an overabundance of applicants from a
particular racial or religious group").
27. See John H. Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U.
CHI. L. REV. 723, 735 ("A White majority is unlikely to disadvantage itself for reasons of
racial prejudice; nor is it likely to be tempted either to underestimate the needs and
deserts of Whites relative to those of others; or to overestimate the costs of devising an
alternative classification that would extend to certain Whites the advantages generally
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discrimination motivated by animus, or perhaps in situations where
Congress has spoken clearly about the need for judicial intervention
into university affairs in a specific area, it is appropriate for federal
courts to substitute their judgment for those of academic
administrators.8  But in the absence of such circumstances, a
substantial sphere of autonomy should exist for the university to act
in ways that further its educational mission.29 As such, it is fair to say
that Justice O'Connor's invocation of educational autonomy in
Grutter did not insulate discriminatory practices from judicial review,
rather it simply recognized that some decisions are best left to
universities when they are made on the basis of educational judgment
and not animus. But if that principle acts to condition the exercise of
academic autonomy, then it is only fair to ask what other limits to
autonomy exist.
Part Two: The Preconditions for Educational Autonomy
As with all forms of deference, the risk with educational
autonomy arguments is that the institutions to which deference is
shown will use them to hide their abuses. I have argued above that, in
general, universities enjoy a greater comparative advantage in
structuring educational settings. But this claim, by itself, could give
universities enough latitude to adopt policies on the basis of animus
and then to cover them up with educational post-hoc justification.
And, in a less sinister vein, the claim could permit universities to
make substantial errors in judgment based on their good-faith beliefs
about the educational benefits of particular decisions. The Supreme
Court has already stated that such results are unacceptable - for it
struck down the University of Michigan undergraduate admissions
policy despite its status as an institution that receives educational
autonomy and despite (presumably) a lack of animus." On this
extended to Blacks.").
28. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244-45 (1976); Kathleen M. Sullivan, After
Affirmative Action, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1039 (1998).
29. See Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 239 (2000) (Souter, J.,
concurring).
30. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 255, 270 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (recognizing
that in Bakke, Justice Powell allowed the "consideration of race as a factor in admissions"
but holding the undergraduate admissions program unconstitutional because "[t]he
current LSA policy does not provide such individualized consideration"); id. at 278
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the university cannot further the diversity of its
student body with an admissions policy that "ensures that the diversity contributions of
applicants cannot be individually assessed" due to systemic flaws).
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narrow tightrope, where the possibility of error is high and where
Justice Scalia has warned that the Court's "Gratz-Grutter split double
header seems perversely designed to prolong the controversy and the
litigation,"'" institutions of higher learning must take particular care
to explain why they are capable of self-governance.
The principle of academic autonomy can and must be formulated
in a way that recognizes their superior institutional competence but
that provides incentives to reduce the likelihood of errors and
animus. The impact of errors and animus is compounded by a veil of
secrecy around the admissions process at most universities, a secrecy
that means that most policies and practices in the admissions office
never see the light of day. We must be broadly fearful of any result
that gives universities an unreviewable pass, and which allows them to
insulate their decisions from any public scrutiny whatsoever due to
the confidentiality of the admissions data for all time. The
combination of deference and secrecy is a particularly potent one,
and instead of eliminating the deference, it is worth asking whether
secrecy policies can be modified in ways that would promote better
decisionmaking within the university.
Begin with the notion of faculty involvement. Many institutions
that may be tempted to plead academic autonomy in admissions
challenge cases do not use faculty at all in their processes - the
admissions decisions are being made by administrators who may lack
understanding about the educational dynamics of the university. 2
And, in some of those universities, the administrators' decisions are
not reviewed by faculty after they are made, at any time, to ensure
that the choices are consistent with the best education the university
can offer. If educational autonomy becomes a license for university
administrators to admit who they want when they want without
faculty oversight, it's not part of academic freedom at all. Rather, it
becomes a lawyer's trick, a way to help a client convert their policy
into something that appears and sounds more lofty and principled
than it really is. And it will collapse under its own weight if permitted
to grow in that way."
31. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 347 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
32. It is significant that Justice Thomas' largely dissenting opinion in Grutter began
with the announcement of his belief that "blacks can achieve in every avenue of American
life without the meddling of university administrators." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 349 (Thomas,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
33. In making this prediction, however, I am reminded that many more erudite than I
have failed at predicting even this specific issue. See, e.g., Yudof, supra note 9, at 855
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Accordingly, I have come to believe that in order to ensure that
educational autonomy does not translate into unfettered discretion,
institutions that seek to consider race as part of their autonomy in the
admissions process cannot keep their admissions data completely
confidential. Complete secrecy breeds bad decisionmaking and
eliminates crucial restraints.34  As Justice Brandeis once said,
"Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants. 35  And yet,
universities constantly refuse to release any admissions data, even
data that is many years old.
We therefore face the important question: to whom should the
data be released? There are four obvious entities that could receive
the data, in ascending order of scope:
1. University administrators
2. Faculty
3. Courts under seal
4. The public
I have argued that a precondition for educational autonomy is
that a University not make admissions choices that prefer certain
candidates on the basis of their race unless they disclose admissions
data to a broader set of people than university administrators (Option
#1). Each of the other types of disclosure produces a range of
consequences, only some of which are foreseeable presently. On the
positive side, greater disclosure brings with it the possibility of
additional checks on erring administrators and faculty. And certainly
only the last choice will maximize the goal of popular accountability;
each of the other options requires some information to be kept from
the public.
36
On the negative side, however, the release of the data,
particularly to the public, can produce ruinous consequences. If the
data is released in ways that allow statistical testing by third parties,
("My own suspicion is that the Powell approach to academic freedom ... was for that day
and trip only and that this face of academic freedom will quickly fade.").
34. Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307 (2003) (discussing
how secrecy in groups can breed groupthink and conformity).
35. L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 62 (National Home Library Foundation
ed. 1933).
36. See Terrance Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political
Responsibility and the Judicial Role, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 695 (1975) ("These policies
are not the product of a politically responsible legislative body, but of decisional processes
internal to the universities that have adopted them.").
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then it may reveal the identities of people who are admitted (or
rejected) - raising serious privacy concerns ex post and reducing the
number of applications ex ante. Its release may stigmatize particular
groups in society - football players, chess players, African-Americans,
whites, those from New York or those from Montana. Because all of
us lack information about what the numbers actually are, as well as
the potential for statistical manipulation and mischief with those
numbers, it is difficult to gauge the impact of public release. After all,
there is reason to fear that this may be the type of decision that Guido
Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt have called a "tragic choice," one in
which there is an appropriate role for "subterfuge" by universities -
either because of the facts contained within the data or the way
manipulation of those facts might skew public debate.37 The public
revelation of the data could simply be too devastating for some
groups in society, as well as some matriculated students. And yet,
there is the strong pull towards sunlight, for its obvious reasons.
This is not the first time those concerned with academic freedom
wrestled with these competing values. In the standard face of
academic freedom, these issues arise all the time: Should the reasons
for a colleague's promotion/tenure denial be released to individuals
outside of the university, such as courts, government bodies, or the
public?3 8 Doing so would ensure a greater amount of scrutiny by
outsiders and would minimize groupthink, but it may also produce
unfair stigmatization of the professor.
The original 1915 committee on academic freedom devised a
classic solution to this problem, one that has become so widespread
37. GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBrrT, TRAGIC CHOICES 195-97 (1978).
38. Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 199-202 (1990) (rejecting claim that the
university's First Amendment academic freedom rights could prevent the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commissions from subpoenaing peer review materials in tenure
discrimination case); EEOC v. Franklin & Marshall Coll., 775 F.2d 110, 114-15 (3d Cir.
1985) (declining "to follow the Seventh and Second Circuits in recognizing either a
qualified academic privilege or in adopting a balancing approach," the court ordered the
production of peer review material after finding no evidence that "Congress intended that
special treatment be accorded academic institutions under investigation for
discrimination"); EEOC v Univ. of Notre Dame Du Lac, 715 F.2d 331, 337-38 (7th Cir.
1983) (employing a balancing test to determine when disclosure is proper after finding
academic freedom could not serve as a "shield to hide discrimination" but that there
existed "a qualified academic freedom privilege protecting academic institutions against
the disclosure of the names and identities of persons participating in the peer review
process"); Zaustinsky v. Univ. of Cal., 96 F.R.D. 622, 625-26 (N.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd
without opinion, 782 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir. 1985) (disallowing unfettered discovery in tenure
discrimination case but providing for in camera inspection of peer review materials to
decide what, if any, of the university's information should be released).
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today that we take it for granted. This is the device of peer review,
which can help to deflate the tension between the desire for
accountability and sunlight on the one hand, and the harms of
stigmatization and privacy loss on the other.39 The idea of peer
review is to require a university to make a candidate's writings
available to faculty from other schools so that experts who are not
directly affiliated with the candidate's school can provide their
opinions. By bringing in outsiders, the tendency toward groupthink is
reduced. And by bringing in experts from the academy itself, peer
review ensures that academics (and not some outside body of
generalists like the federal courts) will provide their judgment in, at
least, the initial stages of an investigation. Peer review, in short, is a
powerful device for the academy to use in furtherance of its self-
governance. Yet despite its prominence in resolving standard,
individualist, academic freedom disputes, peer review has not been
put to use, to my knowledge, as a method for resolving institutional
autonomy matters.
A peer-review proposal for academic autonomy would look
something like this: Universities that would like to take race into
consideration must have their processes reviewed by a national
committee of academics devoted to the task. For law schools, for
example, the American Bar Association and the American
Association of Law Schools could draw on their expertise in creating
committees that review the accreditation of each of our nation's law
schools, and devise a similar committee that would examine
admissions policies. The committee's jurisdiction would only be
invoked when a university wants to use race as an admissions factor -
for a great many law schools, therefore, the committee would play no
role.'0
The obvious risk exists that members of the committee would
apply their own political preferences about affirmative action in lieu
of their educational judgments. This is true, naturally, of any
39. See 1915 Committee Report, supra note 10, at 406 (permitting a college teacher,
before dismissal or demotion, to have a review "by a committee of his fellow specialists
from other institutions"); David M. Rabban, Does Academic Freedom Limit Faculty
Autonomy?, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1405, 1410 (1988) ("Beginning with the 1915 Declaration,
commentators have identified peer review as the primary method of determining whether
individual professors have violated, or have engaged in activities unprotected by, academic
freedom.").
40. Quite obviously, the holding in Grutter is only that a university may adopt an
affirmative action policy to augment the diversity of its student body, not that it must do
so. Those who argue that affirmative action is constitutionally required are, in my
judgment, far off base.
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decisionmaker, including federal judges. But there are ways to
reduce the risk in the peer review context. For example, members of
the committee could be required to sign statements attesting to their
commitment to apply the precepts of both Supreme Court decisions
in the Michigan cases. All of the data about the Michigan programs
should be made available to potential committee members before
signing the statement. If the committee were composed of people
who would find the Michigan undergraduate policy unacceptable and
the law school policy acceptable, it would reduce the dangers of
political bias.
To provide further incentives for good committee
decisionmaking, the standard checks on peer review could be brought
to bear as well, including the selection of committee members known
for divergent political views and the possibility of appointing visiting
academics to serve for temporary periods to preclude collusion
among members of the committee. The majority of the committee,
however, would be composed of long-term repeat players who would
garner expertise and would use that expertise to advise universities
about ways to stay within constitutional boundaries.4 The members
of the committee, if of sufficient stature, will exert an influence on
each other toward responsibility and accountability, in that members
do not want to appear weak or prejudicial to each other. Written
opinions (with dissents) could be issued by the committee, though if
the committee process is working well, then there would not be a
need for their broad release. Other details would need to be fleshed
out, of course, but the notion here is to create a peer review body of
experts who can further the educational goals of the university.
One function of law school accreditation committees, such as the
ABA's, is to ensure that the Bar is able to govern its own affairs
largely free of government involvement. A similar promise exists for
admissions review committees. By permitting experts steeped in the
academy to review specific admissions policies, the case for deference
to those policies is far stronger. As such, when a federal lawsuit is
filed against a policy that the Committee has approved, the generalist
courts should evaluate that lawsuit with a very heavy presumption in
favor of the policy's constitutionality. Without the Committee's
41. The results of these reports might possibly be introduced into court as part of an
institution's autonomy defense or as part of a constitutional challenge. Until the need
squarely arises, however, it could be dangerous to release to the litigants all of the raw
data the commission had before it. Doing so would replicate all the problems with public
release discussed above.
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stamp of approval, however, the case for justifying the policy on the
basis of educational autonomy is far weaker.
If universities are to be responsible players in an increasingly
multicultural world, they must take care to ensure that their
judgments in admissions are not being made with too rough a stroke,
such as with specific point awards based on the color of one's skin.
That roughness, whether deliberate or unintentional, and whether de
facto or de jure, is anathema to the educational mission the university
seeks to maintain. The role of the standing admissions committee
would be not only to ferret out cases of animus, but also to make sure
that admissions choices are being made consistent with the
educational goals of the university. A peer review solution, therefore,
has the positive byproduct of furthering the process of academic
freedom, for it celebrates the university as the locus of
decisionmaking and reaffirming its superior institutional competence
in resolving disputes. 2 Before adopting more radical solutions to the
admissions data problem that could dramatically shift the
expectations of students and society, such as the public release of all
admissions data, we should give peer review a chance.
Conclusion
The principle of academic autonomy recognizes that universities
often have superior competence at making tough admissions policy
choices when compared to federal courts. But university
decisionmaking can also be bureaucratic, too rough, not tailored to
the educational interests at stake, and possibly even tinged by animus.
Without strong procedural limits to the use of academic autonomy,
the doctrine can morph into a monster with pernicious consequences.
It is far too convenient to read Grutter snidely, as a decision that
gives colleges cover to adopt blunt racial preferences, devoid of any
connection to true diversity. But Grutter, just as with Bakke before it,
was based on a wonderful, rich idea: that students can learn from
those with divergent backgrounds and experiences. Academic
autonomy, to retain its meaning, must remain true to that promise in
the admissions context. And this means taking both Grutter and
Gratz seriously, recognizing that universities cannot do whatever they
42. See Rabban, supra note 39, at 1410 ("Peer review helps assure that the decision
rests on valid professional grounds and thus is itself a contribution to academic freedom.
When people without the relevant scholarly background make these judgments, it may
become difficult to avoid suspicions that inappropriate, nonprofessional considerations
played a significant role.")
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want and plead autonomy when the lawyers arrive at the front door.
Academic freedom is a sacred concept, but, like most good things in
life, it must be properly tended to and cherished. Otherwise, the case
for its demise will become too strong. And as powerful a positive
force as Bakke-style affirmative action has been in our society, the
loss of academic autonomy for our nation's universities would be a
terrible price to pay for it.
